Epistemic injustice: A role for recognition? by Giladi, P
Giladi, P (2017)Epistemic injustice: A role for recognition? Philosophy and
Social Criticism, 44 (2). pp. 141-158. ISSN 0191-4537
Downloaded from: http://e-space.mmu.ac.uk/621003/
Publisher: SAGE Publications
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1177/0191453717707237
Please cite the published version
https://e-space.mmu.ac.uk
1 
 
 
Epistemic Injustice: A Role for Recognition? 
     
      My aim in this paper is to propose that an insightful way of articulating the feminist 
concept of epistemic injustice can be provided by paying significant attention to 
recognition theory. The paper intends to provide an account for diagnosing epistemic 
injustice as a social pathology and also attempts to paint a picture of some social cure of 
structural forms of epistemic injustice. While there are many virtues to the literature on 
epistemic injustice, epistemic exclusion, and silencing, current discourse on diagnosing 
as well as explicating and overcoming these social pathologies can be improved and 
enriched by bringing recognition theory into the conversation: under recognition theory, 
social normative standards are constructed out of the moral grammar of recognition 
attributions. I shall argue that the failure to properly recognise and afford somebody or a 
social group the epistemic respect they merit is an act of injustice in the sense of 
depriving individuals of a progressive social environment in which the epistemic respect 
afforded to them plays a significant role in enabling and fostering their self-confidence as 
a rational enquirer. Testimonial injustice is particularly harrowing, because it robs a 
group or individual of their status as a rational enquirer, thereby creating an 
asymmetrical cognitive environment in which they are not deemed one’s conversational 
peer. Hermeneutical injustice is particularly harrowing, because asymmetrical cognitive 
environments further entrench the normative power of ideology.   
       
I 
      The concept of epistemic injustice, as articulated by, for example, Miranda Fricker 
(2007), emerges out of and has re-invigorated a rich line of work in feminist 
epistemology on epistemic exclusion, silencing, and subordination.1 The foundational 
insight of this area of “critical social epistemology”,2 elegantly articulated by Charles 
Mills (2007), is the idea that our epistemic practices – from innocuous instances of belief 
                                                 
1 Notable contributions here include work on silencing by Ishani Maitra (2004, 2009); on different forms of 
testimonial injustice by Kristie Dotson (2011, 2012, 2014a, 2014b); on distorted communicative dynamics 
by Jose Medina (2004, 2006, 2012, 2013); and on epistemologies of ignorance (the phenomenon of 
motivated ignorance on the part of empowered groups) by Charles Mills (1997, 2007) and Linda Alcoff 
(2007). 
Sadly, I have not had the space in this particular paper to properly engage with epistemologies of 
ignorance, and what generates pathologies in the space of reasons. Like Mills and Matthew Congdon, I 
think there is a need for work on the relation between epistemologies of ignorance and the Myth of the 
Given.      
2 M. Congdon, 2015: 76. 
2 
 
 
formation to the ways one goes about credibility attribution – involve social mediation.3 In 
the spirit of Wilfrid Sellars’s famous rejection of a non-conceptual Given acting as the 
normative foundation for perceptual beliefs and judgements, critical social epistemology 
argues that social structures and social attitudes permeate our epistemic practices all the 
way through: an important advantage of the Sellarsian commitment to conceptually 
mediated intentional states and perceptual judgements is how one can be alert to the 
ways in which race prejudices or gender biases or many other long-held socio-cultural 
views “can embed themselves in our thinking, distorting even basic instances of 
empirical claim-making, memory, and belief-formation”.4 Arguably, the most serious 
distortion involves acts of epistemic injustice. 
      Epistemic injustice arises when somebody or a social group is wronged in their 
“capacity as a knower”.5 This can happen usually in two ways: (i) testimonial injustice, 
which occurs when a speaker’s assertions are given less credibility than they deserve 
because the hearer has prejudices about a social group of which the speaker is a member; 
(ii) hermeneutical injustice, which occurs when as a result of a social structure rendering 
social group X powerless, members of social group X lack the cognitive resources to 
adequately make sense of their social powerlessness. With regard to testimonial injustice, 
it would be helpful to illustrate this with an example used by Jane McConkey (2004), a 
true story told by Patricia Williams:     
 
I was shopping in Soho [in Benetton’s] and saw a sweater that I wanted to buy for 
my mother. I pressed my round brown face to the window and my finger to the 
buzzer, seeking admittance. A narrow-eyed, white teenager wearing running shoes 
and feasting on bubble gum glared out, evaluating me for signs that would pit me 
against the limits of his social understanding. After about five seconds, he mouthed 
“We’re closed”, and blew pink rubber at me. It was two Saturdays before 
Christmas, at one o’clock in the afternoon; there were several white people in the 
store who appeared to be shopping for things for their mothers. I was enraged. At 
that moment I literally wanted to break all the windows of the store and take lots of 
sweaters for my mother. In the flicker of his judgemental grey eyes, that sales-child 
had transformed my brightly sentimental, joy-to-the-world, pre-Christmas spree to a 
shambles ... I am still struck by the structure of power that drove me into such a 
blizzard of rage ... No words, no gestures, no prejudices of my own would make a 
bit of difference to him; his refusal to let me into the store ... was an outward 
manifestation of his never having let someone like me into the realm of his reality. 
(P. J. Williams, 1991: 44-5)   
 
                                                 
3 To quote Robert Brandom here, we understand “normative statuses as social statuses” (R. B. Brandom, 
2000: 34).  
4 Congdon, 2015: 78. 
5 M. Fricker, 2007: 20. 
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A rumour got started that the Benetton’s story wasn’t true, that I had made it up, 
that it was a fantasy, a lie that was probably the product of a diseased mind trying 
to make all white people feel guilty. At this point I realised it almost didn’t make 
any difference whether I was telling the truth or not – that the greater issue I had to 
face was the overwhelming weight of a disbelief that goes beyond mere 
disinclination to believe and becomes active suppression of anything I might have 
to say. (Williams, 1991: 242)    
 
 
In addition to having her personal integrity harmed by the shop clerk’s racial prejudices, 
Williams suffered further injustice by having her claims dismissed and not afforded 
serious credibility:6 rather than be accorded the default level of epistemic respect and 
doxastic appreciation provided by Tyler Burge’s Acceptance Principle,7 Williams is not 
only treated with epistemic scorn, she is also stripped of any normative authority, and is 
deemed as someone who violates norms of assertion.8  
      With regard to hermeneutical injustice, it would be helpful to illustrate this with an 
example used by Fricker from the memoir of Susan Brownmiller:    
 
Carmita Wood, age forty-four, born and raised in the apple orchard region of Lake 
Cayuga, and the sole support of two of her children, had worked for eight years in 
Cornell’s department of nuclear physics, advancing from lab assistant to a desk job 
handling administrative chores. Wood did not know why she had been singled out, 
or indeed if she had been singled out, but a distinguished professor seemed unable 
to keep his hands off her. 
As Wood told the story, the eminent man would jiggle his crotch when he stood 
near her desk and looked at his mail, or he’d deliberately brush against her breasts 
while reaching for some papers. One night as the lab workers were leaving their 
annual Christmas party, he cornered her in the elevator and planted some 
unwanted kisses on her mouth. After the Christmas party incident, Carmita Wood 
went out of her way to use the stairs in the lab building in order to avoid a repeat 
encounter, but the stress of the furtive molestations and her efforts to keep the 
                                                 
6 Cf. J. McConkey, 2004: 202-3: “Patricia Williams made claims to knowledge arising as a result of her 
experiences as a black woman and this is both part of the reason why those claims were viewed as 
controversial and why they were disbelieved. Belonging to underprivileged social groups whose experience 
sharply differs from those who constitute more powerful groups, she provided a perspective that offered a 
challenge to the dominant norms in society. But her accusations of racism were quickly dismissed as 
imaginings or exaggerations. She suffered from an inability of others to appreciate the perspective from 
which her assertions had sprung and from the stereotypes and prejudices about black women that fed into 
the credibility assessment others made of her.” 
7 Cf. T. Burge, 1993: 467. 
8 Paul Grice’s Cooperative Principle (Grice, 1975: 26-30) is composed of four norms governing proper 
linguistic interaction with fellow speakers:   
 
Cooperative Principle: Contribute what is required by the accepted purpose of the conversation. 
 
Maxim of Quality: Make your contribution true; so do not convey what you believe false or unjustified. 
Maxim of Quantity: Be as informative as required. 
Maxim of Relation: Be relevant. 
Maxim of Manner: Be perspicuous; so avoid obscurity and ambiguity, and strive for brevity and order. 
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scientist at a distance while maintain cordial relations with his wife, whom she 
liked, brought on a host of physical symptoms. Wood developed chronic back and 
neck pains. Her right thumb tingled and grew numb. She requested a transfer to 
another department, and when it didn’t come through, she quit. She walked out the 
door and went to Florida for some rest and recuperation. Upon her return she 
applied for unemployment insurance. When the claims investigator asked why she 
had left her job after eight years, Wood was at a loss to describe the hateful 
episodes. She was ashamed and embarrassed. Under prodding – the blank on the 
form needed to be filled in – she answered that her reasons had been personal. Her 
claim for unemployment was denied. 
‘Lin’s students had been talking in her seminar about the unwanted sexual 
advances they’d encountered on their summer jobs,’ Sauvigne relates. ‘And then 
Carmita Wood comes in and tells Lin her story. We realised that to a person, every 
one of us – the women on staff, Carmita, the students – had had an experience like 
this at some point, you know? And none of us had ever told anyone before. It was 
one of those click, aha! moments, a profound revelation. 
The women had their issue. Meyer located two feminist lawyers in Syracuse, Susan 
Horn and Maurie Heins, to take on Carmita Wood’s unemployment insurance 
appeal. ‘And then …,’ Sauvigne reports, ‘we decided that we also had to hold a 
speak-out in order to break the silence about this.’ 
The ‘this’ they were going to break the silence about had no name. ‘Eight of us 
were sitting in an office of Human Affairs,’ Sauvigne remembers, ‘brainstorming 
about what we were going to write on the posters for our speak-out. We were 
referring to it as “sexual intimidation,” “sexual coercion,” “sexual exploitation on 
the job.” None of those names seemed quite right. We wanted something that 
embraced a whole range of subtle and unsubtle persistent behaviours. Somebody 
came up with “harassment.” Sexual harassment! Instantly we agreed. That’s what it 
was. (S. Brownmiller, 1990: 280-1)    
 
The epistemic injustice suffered by Wood and many other women here is hermeneutical, 
because it concerns the specific ways in which cognitive resources for interpreting one’s 
experiences are maldistributed in accordance with the background unequal power 
relations governing identities: at the time of second-wave feminism, women were still 
rather socially powerless, in no small part due to the way unequal power relations had 
structured negative social attitudes and legal precedents. As a direct result of being and 
remaining socially powerless, they were “hermeneutically marginalised”,9 prevented 
from having access to the epistemic resources required to make adequate sense of their 
powerlessness. Consequently, the hermeneutical marginalisation created and sustained a 
form of propositional paralysis, what Fricker calls “cognitive disablement”,10 where, for 
example, victims of sexual harassment are unable to articulate features of their experience 
for their own full understanding. For Wood, “[h]er hermeneutical disadvantage renders 
                                                 
9 Fricker, 2007: 153.  
10 Ibid., p. 151. 
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her unable to make sense of her ongoing mistreatment, and this in turn prevents her from 
protesting it, let alone securing effective measures to stop it”.11 
      Having sketched the central themes of testimonial injustice and hermeneutical 
injustice, I would now like to turn to the central themes of recognition theory before 
explicating how recognition theory can positively contribute to diagnosing and treating 
epistemic injustice. 
 
II  
      One of the key developments in interdisciplinary social theory over recent decades 
has been the rise of diagnostic social philosophy.12 In the words of its leading 
contemporary exponent, the third-generation Critical Theorist Axel Honneth, such a 
tradition “… is primarily concerned with determining and discussing processes of social 
development that can be viewed as misdevelopments, disorders or ‘social pathologies’ … 
Its primary task is the diagnosis of processes of social development that must be 
understood as preventing the members of society from living a ‘good life’”.13 Under such 
a framework, the methodology of diagnostic social philosophy roughly follows the 
approach of curing some kind of ailment or disease:14 just as a physician will first 
diagnose the condition and then administer some cure, the diagnostic social theorist 
must first diagnose the relevant social problem and then work out a cogent means of 
curing the malady.15  
                                                 
11 Ibid., p. 151. 
12 The diagnostic social philosophical tradition has its historical roots in the work of de Tocqueville, 
Rousseau, Hegel, Marx, Mill, Nietzsche, Tönnies, Durkheim, Weber, Lukács, Spengler, Dewey, Plessner, 
Fromm, Horkheimer and Adorno, Marcuse, Bataille, Gehlen, Heller, Márcus, Arendt, Habermas, 
Foucault, and Taylor.   
13 A. Honneth, 2007a: 4.  
14 “First, each theorist points to some malady or ailment that troubles their own society, and identifies 
some particular causes of that disorder which are specifically social. That is, the disorder is said to be 
rooted in the particular ordering or structuring or practices of the society. Further, the disorder identified is 
said to be a social problem or pathology because it impedes the ability of individuals to live fulfilling, or 
fully realised, or ethically praiseworthy, or happy lives. Thus the inability of individuals to live the “good 
life” according to the standards of the theory is said to be caused by particular features of the present social 
ordering” (C. F. Zurn, 2015: 93). 
15 An important qualification should be made here: what counts as health is a matter of empirical fact and 
the relation between therapy and achieving physical health is a nomological relation. But what counts as a 
good life or a flourishing society (where it is possible for all citizens to live a good life) is not a matter of 
empirical fact. Furthermore, it is not clear that the relation between ethical actions and political 
programmes on the one hand and goals like a good life or a flourishing society on the other hand need be 
nomological. So, I would argue that whatever social pathologies are, they are categorically distinct from 
the sort of pathologies we find in medicine. My feeling is that social pathologies are best understood in 
terms of alienation (and this is why Hegel, Marx, and Nietzsche – among others – play a special role in 
understanding social pathologies). 
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      For Honneth, the hallmark concept for articulating the formal complexities of social 
structures, attitudes, and pathologies is intersubjective recognition, the practice of 
acknowledging and being acknowledged by others, specifically “affective approval or 
encouragement”:16 in his first major work, The Struggle for Recognition (a combination of 
Hegel, G. H. Mead, and Donald Winnicott), Honneth’s underlying claim is that the 
process of gaining recognition intersubjectively is identical to the journey of self-
realisation as a social and rational agent: “practical identity-formation presupposes 
intersubjective recognition”.17 Taking inspiration from Hegel’s three forms of 
intersubjectivity – love, legal relations, and solidarity –, Honneth draws distinctions 
between three forms of practical self-understanding, namely self-confidence, self-respect, 
and self-esteem: self-confidence refers to the basic sense of the stability and continuity of 
one’s self as a differentiated individual with particular needs and emotions that require 
intersubjective recognition to be meaningfully constituted. Self-respect comes from being 
recognised as part of an equal legal community, where being part of a legal community 
as an equal member under the protection of law affords one social respect. And self-esteem 
comes from having one’s traits and accomplishments positively recognised either by 
fellow members of one’s individual community or by other communities of value.    
      Social conflict, then, is understood to arise from how certain collective groups within 
a given society experience either misrecognition or nonrecognition: in cases of 
misrecognition, the recognition order of a society acknowledges the subjectivity of a 
group or minority, but, incorrectly, does not afford that particular subjectivity the same 
level of respect and value as that of the majority. In cases of nonrecognition, the 
recognition order of a society incorrectly fails to acknowledge the subjectivity of a group 
or minority, incorrectly affording that group or minority no positive normative status at 
all. 
      Both misrecognition and nonrecognition are severely detrimental to human 
development, since they are not genuine forms of intersubjective recognition: “[t]hrough 
intersubjective recognition, [one] is engaged in the process of self-realisation with respect 
to [one’s] practical relation-to-self”,18 to the extent that the self-realisation of any 
individual can only be achieved in a progressive social environment. Since human beings 
                                                 
16 Honneth, 1996: 95. 
17 Ibid., p. 92. 
18 Zurn, 2015: 25.   
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are “intersubjectively vulnerable”,19 to quote Fred Neuhouser on this subject, “[t]he idea 
here is that each type of identity has a distinct value for individuals and that possessing 
them all is essential to realising the full range of possible modes of selfhood. To miss out 
on any of these forms of social membership, then, is to be deprived of one of the basic 
ways of being a self and hence to suffer an impoverishment of one’s life”.20 
      By explicating the recognition order of a society through uncovering the moral 
grammar of that society, one is able to reveal the moral and social commitments governing 
how members interact with one another. This aims to practically aid emancipation by 
realising the immanent emancipatory potential found in contemporary social structures 
and social attitudes, in order to transcend the current intersubjective framework to realise 
full human freedom.  
 
III  
      Recognition theory on the one hand, and contemporary epistemological work 
informed by feminism and critical race theory on the other, have developed largely 
separately from one another, notwithstanding significant points of overlap.21 Yet these 
fields of discussion have considerable bearing on one another.  
      From a recognition theory perspective, I think testimonial injustice is particularly 
harrowing, because it robs a group or individual of their status as a rational enquirer, 
thereby creating an asymmetrical cognitive environment in which they are not deemed 
one’s conversational peer. To see how this works, it would be particularly helpful to 
articulate an analogy between Honneth’s account of how torture and rape constitute 
denials of self-confidence and a recognition theoretic account of testimonial injustice: for 
Honneth, the trauma inflicted by torture and rape involves an often irreparable breach of 
one’s foundational self-confidence in one’s body.22 As he writes:   
 
The forms of practical maltreatment in which a person is forcibly deprived of any 
opportunity freely to dispose over his or her own body represent the most 
fundamental sort of personal degradation. This is because every attempt to gain 
control of a person’s body against his or her will – irrespective of the intention 
behind it – causes a degree of humiliation that impacts more destructively than 
other forms of respect on a person’s practical relation-to-self. For what is specific to 
these kinds of physical injury, as exemplified by torture and rape, is not the purely 
                                                 
19 Ibid., p. 33.  
20 F. Neuhouser, 2008: 223.  
21 E.g. Young (1990).  
22 See Breakwell (1983). 
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physical pain but rather the combination of this pain with the feeling of being 
defencelessly at the mercy of another subject, to the point of feeling that one has 
been deprived of reality. Physical abuse represents a type of disrespect that does 
lasting damage to one’s basic confidence (learned through love) that one can 
autonomously coordinate one’s own body … Thus, the kind of recognition that this 
type of disrespect deprives one of is the taken-for-granted respect for the 
autonomous control of one’s own body, which itself could only be acquired at all 
through experience emotional support as part of the socialisation process.23 
 
Since the violation of bodily integrity represents the violation of one’s most basic and 
self-evident way of interacting with one’s external environment, torture and rape prevent 
one from trusting others and oneself – “the suffering of torture or rape is always 
accompanied by a dramatic breakdown in one’s trust in the reliability of the social world 
and hence by a collapse in one’s own basic self-confidence”.24  
      Thus far, I have articulated the central features of Honneth’s account of the traumatic 
effects of torture and rape on a person’s foundational self-confidence. To develop the 
analogy between Honneth’s account of how torture and rape constitute denials of self-
confidence and a recognition theoretic account of testimonial injustice, I would like now 
to return to the example used by McConkey to articulate testimonial injustice: I claimed 
that rather than be accorded the default level of epistemic respect and doxastic 
appreciation provided by Burge’s Acceptance Principle, Patricia Williams is not only 
treated with epistemic scorn, she is also stripped of any normative authority, 
nonrecognised, and is deemed as someone who violates norms of assertion. To use a 
Sellarsian tournure de phrase, testimonial injustice deprives Williams, a rational agent, of 
her rightful place as someone moving in the space of reasons25 and thereby leaves 
individuals like her who are prejudiced against in a state of self-alienation: because 
Williams is not recognised26 – as opposed to recognised but treated with less credibility than other 
epistemic participants – she is forcibly alienated from her own rationality, where her 
                                                 
23 Honneth, 1996: 132-3. 
24 Ibid., p. 133. 
See Scarry (1985). 
25 “In characterising an episode or state as that of knowing, we are not giving an empirical description of 
that episode or state; we are placing it in the logical space of reasons, of justifying and being able to justify 
what one says.” (Sellars, 1997: §36).  
For a similar account, see Jones (2002). 
26 See the following similar remark by Fricker: “[T]here will be few contexts in which a hearer’s prejudice 
is so insanely thoroughgoing that he fails to regard his interlocutor as a subject of knowledge at all”. 
(Fricker, 2007: 134-5).  
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rationality enables her to be a member of a community of inquirers.27 Crucially, the 
asymmetrical nature of the cognitive environment causes Williams to feel that the space 
of reasons, the locus of normative discourse where epistemic practices derive their sense 
of meaning and purpose, is not welcoming to her. As Iris Marion Young writes:  
 
In societies stamped with cultural imperialism, groups suffering from this form of 
oppression stand in a paradoxical position. They are understood in terms of crude 
stereotypes that do not accurately portray individual group members but also 
assume a mask of invisibility; they are both badly misrepresented and robbed of the 
means by which to express their perspective. Groups who live with cultural 
imperialism find themselves defined externally, positioned by a web of meanings 
that arise elsewhere. These meanings and definitions have been imposed on them 
by people who cannot identify with them and with whom they cannot identify.28 
 
Given that testimonial injustice causes a victim to be alienated from both their own 
rationality and from the practices which necessarily constitute normative discourse 
between epistemic peers, I think one has compelling reason to think that nonrecognition 
and exclusion from the space of reasons amounts to discursive abuse: “the experience of 
being disrespected carries with it the danger of an injury that can bring the identity of the 
person as a whole to the point of collapse”,29 where the identity under threat here is a 
person’s self-interpretation as Geistig.30 The failure to properly recognise and afford 
somebody or a social group the epistemic respect they merit is an act of injustice in the 
sense of depriving individuals of a progressive social environment in which the epistemic 
respect afforded to them plays a significant role in enabling and fostering their self-
confidence as a rational enquirer.31 Conceived in this way, one can see the analogous 
parallel with Honneth’s analysis of the harmful effects of torture or rape on self-
confidence:  
  
   
                                                 
27 “The intrinsic harm of testimonial injustice as epistemic objectification: when a hearer undermines a 
speaker in her capacity as a giver of knowledge, the speaker is epistemically objectified”. (Fricker, 2007: 
133). 
28 I. M. Young, 1990: 59.  
29 Honneth, 1996: 130-1. 
See Breakwell (1983). 
30 See the following similar remark by Fricker: “Persistent testimonial injustice can indeed inhibit the very 
formation of self”. (Fricker, 2007: 55). 
31 I think there is an especially interesting comparison between this claim and Nancy Daukas’s concept of 
epistemic charity: “normal practices of epistemic interaction and cooperation require that members of an 
epistemic community typically extend to one another the presumption that they meet some threshold level 
of epistemic credibility” (N. Daukas, 2006: 110).   
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Torture or Rape Testimonial Injustice 
External and forcible control over one’s own bodily 
integrity 
External and forcible control over one’s own epistemic 
integrity 
Violation of bodily integrity prevents one from 
trusting others and oneself to the distressing extent 
that victims internalise culpability  
Violation of epistemic integrity prevents one from 
trusting others and one’s own rational capacities to the 
distressing extent that victims internalise culpability  
“Physical abuse represents a type of disrespect that 
does lasting damage to one’s basic confidence … that 
one can autonomously coordinate one’s own body”32 
Discursive abuse represents a type of disrespect that 
does lasting damage to one’s basic confidence that one 
can autonomously coordinate one’s own claims and 
participate in the game of giving and asking for reasons 
 
A further harm of the denial of epistemic recognition as a fellow member of a normative 
community is that the collapse of self-confidence as a rational enquirer stultifies a 
person’s ability to actively participate in practices designed to bring about social change: 
the asymmetrical nature of the cognitive environment means that those who are 
accorded no testimonial credibility are further rendered powerless by having their 
knowledge claims, which challenge various social attitudes, summarily dismissed. As 
McConkey writes: 
 
It is questionable whether an individual or group could ever really be regarded as 
an effective challenger to the dominant interpretations in society if they were not 
understood as credible knowers. In order to defy their invisibility in the self-
understandings of society, putative knowers have to have their new claims to 
knowledge accepted as at least possibly true. They must be considered as people 
who can reliably tell us how things are, but this will only be achieved when they are 
afforded credibility.33 
 
In addition, there is a significant danger that testimonial nonrecognition and the lasting 
effects of discursive abuse can be so systemic to the extent that a victim can end up 
thinking they are at fault or that they deserve such treatment: as rational agents, we do not 
view ourselves as normatively self-supporting. However, this does not mean that we 
thereby relinquish our status as independent thinkers. Rather, this means that we 
continuously check our individual commitments and judgements against the 
commitments and judgements of our fellow agents. Such a subject is active in that they 
                                                 
32 Honneth, 1996: 132.   
33 McConkey, 2004: 204.  
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are not passive “in the use of [their] reason”,34 where the sense of passivity here is one 
which is formally similar to that of the logical egoist, namely someone who considers 
themselves “to be cognitively self-sufficient”.35 Since human beings are intersubjectively 
vulnerable and pay attention to how they are regarded by one another, critical comments 
are often understood as offering opportunities for self-improvement.36 For example, 
receiving a reviewer’s report on a paper submitted to a professional academic journal 
which recommends rejection or revision and resubmission can often alert an author to 
weaknesses or errors on the author’s part. However, regressive recognition orders 
deliberately exploit intersubjective vulnerability and pervert communicative dynamics of 
critique by making those excluded from the social space of reasons feel as though their 
rejection is entirely the result of their failings. Systemic testimonial nonrecognition 
permeates individuals’ or a social group’s psychology to the extent that individuals or a 
social group are made to blame themselves for not being deemed worthy enough to be 
afforded credibility. 
      Thus far, I have offered reasons for thinking there is a substantive role for recognition 
theory to play in articulating testimonial injustice and its harmful effects. However, I 
would now like to turn to a discussion of whether there is any scope for recognition 
theory treating the social pathology of testimonial injustice: for Fricker, the best means of 
combating testimonial injustice involves the Aristotelian notion of moral training, 
specifically the idea of training testimonial sensibility: listeners need to be trained well to 
develop as far as possible non-prejudicial attitudes about both their interlocutors (and 
themselves).37 As she writes: 
 
[P]erhaps we should think of the ideal hearer as someone for whom correcting for 
familiar prejudices has become second nature, while the requisite alertness to the 
influence of less familiar prejudices remains a matter of ongoing active critical 
reflection. This seems about right. What matters is that somehow or other one 
succeeds, reliably enough (through time and across a suitable span of prejudices), in 
correcting for prejudice in one’s credibility judgements. If one succeeds in that, then 
one has got the virtue of testimonial justice.38 
 
                                                 
34 K. Deligiorgi, 2002: 150.  
35 Ibid., p. 150.  
36 See Kant, APPV: 128-29 and LL: §57, 563; §740.  
37 In response to Fricker, Alcoff (2010) argues that since prejudice and bias are often unconscious 
intentional states, it is practically impossible to consciously correct those attitudes. However, I think her 
critique may be attacking a straw-man, since Fricker is alert to implicit bias and her position recognises the 
challenges facing overcoming entrenched socio-cognitive dysfunctions.   
38 Fricker, 2007: 98.  
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A key feature of Fricker’s project of training testimonial sensibility involves the hearer 
developing greater empathetic competency. Empathy plays a crucial role here just not 
because this particular kind of intentional emotional state is a formal condition for trust,39 
but also because empathy is required to make the right kind of credibility attribution 
judgement: minimal levels of empathetic engagement invariably prevent a hearer from 
being salient to or correct for prejudice, since the failure to put oneself in one’s 
interlocutor’s shoes – whether due to emotional immaturity or due to personal 
vindictiveness – results in epistemic misperception. As Fricker writes: “If, for instance, her 
lack of empathetic skill renders her unable to pick up on the fact that her interlocutor is 
afraid of her (perhaps he is a school pupil and she the head teacher), then she may well 
misperceive his manner, taking him, for instance, to be insincere when he is not”.40  
      While there are virtues to Fricker’s account of empathy, epistemic exclusion, and 
silencing, I think empathy is too individualistic, and we need to theorise recognition and 
mis/nonrecognition as social phenomena. For the recognition theorist, testimonial 
injustice is classed as a particular variety of social pathology. Since testimonial injustice 
is analysed here under what one may call a clinical framework, we shall find, in what 
follows, that recognition theory provides a more complex but complementary diagnosis 
and social cure of discursive abuse: for testimonial injustice to be categorised as a social 
pathology, this described phenomenon needs to be established as something that is 
pervasively experienced throughout society. What this means is that one can legitimately 
regard a pathological property or symptom to have social reach only if there is compelling 
reason to think that the pathogens do not occur only in isolated and individual instances.  
      Once we understand the social scope of the experiences of testimonial disrespect and 
alienation, we then develop an epidemiology of discursive abuse that goes beyond the 
proto-typical social scientific statistical practices of questionnaires and reports, since, as 
Christopher Zurn correctly writes, “maladies … are not often acknowledged as such by 
those who suffer from or are subject to them”.41 Moreover, the recognition theorist’s 
sensitivity to the limitation of proto-typical social scientific statistical practices as an 
appropriate epidemiological methodology for treating social pathologies also points 
towards a sophisticated form of critical social aetiology and therapy: relations of 
misrecognition and nonrecognition and processes of epistemic exclusion and silencing 
                                                 
39 See Jones (1996). 
40 Fricker, 2007: 79. 
41 Zurn, 2015: 114.  
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are mutually supporting: what sustains an asymmetrical social structure is an asymmetrical 
cognitive environment wherein some speakers are illegitimately deprived of participating 
in epistemic practices; what sustains an asymmetrical cognitive environment is an 
asymmetrical social structure wherein some members assume a mask of invisibility. 
Since recognition theory offers a diagnosis of a social malady in terms of uncovering the 
moral grammar underlying an asymmetrical recognition order, the kind of therapeutic 
programme is one rooted in developing the conditions required to bring about 
intersubjective testimonial recognition. The practice of overcoming epistemic unsociability 
and realising our epistemic sociability seems to share much in common with the process of 
transitioning from asymmetrical recognition orders to genuinely symmetrical recognition orders, 
since true sociality does not merely consist in interacting with others simpliciter, but rather 
in interacting with others in such a way that enables self-realisation.    
      I think there are a number of important advantages to this approach: (i) articulating 
the relationship between structures of regressive recognition and regressive epistemic 
practices in terms of mutual sustainment rather than a linear top-down or linear bottom-
up relation aids the critical theoretic understanding of the social sphere as a dynamic and 
complex normative domain; (ii) realising our epistemic sociability in terms of 
transitioning from asymmetrical recognition orders to genuinely symmetrical recognition 
orders necessarily requires significant empathetic engagement: attentiveness to the 
particularity of the other person, in light of difference, is precisely what is required for 
genuine recognition. This Hegelian remark both complements and expands on Fricker’s 
position on  training empathy: attentiveness to the particularity of the other person is not 
only a crucial feature of empathetic competency, the Hegelian claim also provides a 
significant metaphysical backstory concerning the way in which intersubjectivity and 
empathy are constituted by developing mediated unity out of immediate unity’s 
sublation by difference. This is why Hegel famously claims that a self-consciousness can 
only be satisfied by another self-consciousness.42 Whilst mutual recognition is partly 
designed to follow Kantian respect, since we should not treat others as means to an end, 
mutual recognition goes further, for not only should we treat others as ends in 
themselves, but we have realised that recognition of others as equals is a necessary condition for 
the possibility of us achieving self-consciousness in a significantly normative manner.43 Our 
                                                 
42 Cf. “Self-consciousness achieves its satisfaction only in another self-consciousness.” (PS : §175, 110) 
43 Given this, I think it is worth comparing Hegel’s position with what Kant writes in Idea for a 
Universal History with a Cosmopolitan Aim: “Human beings have an inclination to associate with one 
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unsociable sociability – to use Kant’s term –44 forces us to engage in all sorts of 
unpleasant and reprehensible practices, whose consequences are so harrowing that they 
rationally compel us to overcome those structures and social attitudes that are 
symptomatic of the unsociable aspects of our nature, so that we can fully develop 
empathetic engagement; (iii)  an especially illuminating feature of the recognition 
approach, one which both feminism and critical race theory can find helpful, is the way 
it articulates the complexities of the collective phenomenology of disrespect and the rational 
motivation to express collective resistance to such disrespect. As Honneth writes:    
 
Feelings of having been disrespected … form the core of moral experiences that are 
part of the structure of social interaction because human subjects encounter one 
another with expectations for recognition, expectations on which their 
psychological integrity turns. Feelings of having been unjustly treated can lead to 
collective actions to the extent to which they come to be experienced by an entire 
circle of subjects as typical for their social situation … [T]he models of conflict that 
start from the collective feelings of having been unjustly treated are those that trace 
the emergence and course of social struggles back to moral experiences of social 
groups who face having … recognition withheld from them … [In this case] we are 
dealing with the analysis of a struggle over the intersubjective conditions for 
personal integrity.45 
 
The importance of emphasising collective experiences of a social pathology such as 
discursive abuse lies in a descriptively rich, anti-abstract account of current societal 
failings, and in an emancipatory narrative concerning how immanent social critique 
points towards, what Honneth calls, the ‘untapped normative surplus’ in society: 
collective experiences of a social pathology can lead to Consciousness-Raising initiatives, 
which in turn can help bring about solidarity movements, to form practical ways of 
bringing about social change, “an innerworldly instance of transcendence”.46 For 
example, with regard to testimonial injustice, the epidemiology of this form of epistemic 
abuse is endemic enough to unite those who experience testimonial injustice in different 
ways and those who express solidarity with those victims. It is precisely because outrage 
at such a social pathology and a concerted effort to end this genus of oppression is ever-
growing that one has compelling reason to think experiences of testimonial injustice 
                                                                                                                                                        
another because in such a condition they feel themselves to be more human, that is to say, more in a 
position to develop their natural predispositions.” (Idea: 8:20-21) 
44 Cf. Idea: 8:26.  
45 Honneth, 1996: 163.   
46 A. Honneth & N. Fraser, 2003: 238. 
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coalesce into movements which have the capability of reforming the current recognition 
structure.47  
        In response, a potential critic of the recognition theorist may well object to the 
putative virtues of realising the goals of epistemic sociability under the framework of 
intersubjective recognition: not only does the concept of intersubjective recognition fail 
to explain how power operates in the normatively integrated social spheres – the ways in 
which “power relations centrally structure intersubjective recognition”48 – the concept 
also fails to show adequate sensitivity to how forms of recognition themselves produce 
and endorse unequal power between people.49 In other words, the principal problem with 
recognition theory as offering a cure for the social pathology of testimonial injustice is 
that it is hopelessly naïve and insensitive to the workings of identity power and 
prejudice. For, one can argue that the very notion of a ‘recognition order’ presupposes 
the vocabulary and practices of hierarchical relations, to the extent that if one aims to bring 
about a genuinely symmetrical cognitive environment in which epistemic participants are 
acutely sensitive to the surreptitious presence and power of prejudice, one needs to 
radically think of the space of reasons in terms of Gloria Steinem’s Gandhian notion of 
listening circles.50    
      Though the critique of the recognition theorist seems compelling – even the most 
sympathetic defender of recognition theory would recognise the lack of a satisfactory 
theory of power – I would not regard this limitation to be a “call for rejection, but for 
further work in broadening and diversifying the basic social theory”:51 there seems to be 
nothing in the conceptual resources of either theories of power or the current iteration of 
recognition theory to suggest that they cannot be compatible with one another, not in the 
least because both approaches are exemplars of anti-ideal social philosophy.52 For, that 
Honneth puts significant emphasis on sociology and historiography gives one prima facie 
reason to hope that the power relations theorist and the recognition theorist can pool 
their respective resources: 
 
                                                 
47 I think there is an especially interesting comparison between this claim and Anderson (2012).   
48 Zurn, 2015: 209.   
49 See Allen (2010), Connolly (2010), Ferrarese (2009), McNay (2008), Petherbridge (2013), Rössler (2007), 
and Young (2007).  
50 Steinem (2016). I am greatly indebted to Eleanor Bainbridge for pointing me to Steinem’s memoir here. 
51 Zurn, 2015: 205.  
52 Some concept of social alienation à la Marcuse can play a central role in explaining both asymmetrical 
recognition orders and how power operates.   
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The motor and the medium of the historical process of realising institutionalised 
principles of freedom is not the law, at least not in the first instance, but social 
struggles over the appropriate understanding of these principles and the resulting 
changes of behaviour. Therefore, the fact that contemporary theories of justice are 
guided almost exclusively by the legal paradigm is a theoretical folly. We must 
instead take account of sociology and historiography, as these disciplines are 
inherently more sensitive to changes in everyday moral behaviour.53  
 
Because recognition theory places so much importance on accounting for the formal and 
qualitative dimensions of the experiences of those suffering from disrespect,54 I think there is 
compelling reason to believe that there is significant scope for recognition theory 
articulating Fricker’s project of training the ideal hearer in relation to Steinem’s concept 
of empathetic listening circles. 
      Having explicated how recognition theory can positively contribute to diagnosing 
and treating testimonial injustice, I would now like to turn to how recognition theory can 
positively contribute to diagnosing and treating hermeneutical injustice.       
 
IV 
      Returning to the example used by Fricker to articulate hermeneutical injustice, I 
claimed that as a direct result of being and remaining socially powerless, Carmita Wood 
and many other women were prevented from having access to the epistemic resources 
required to make adequate sense of their powerlessness. Consequently, the 
hermeneutical marginalisation created and sustained a form of propositional paralysis, 
where, for example, victims of sexual harassment are unable to articulate features of their 
experience for their own full understanding.  
      One particularly helpful way which recognition theory can contribute to articulating 
hermeneutical injustice is by looking at the Marxian concept of ideology: as a pathology 
of capitalism, ideology refers to those social and cultural attitudes designed to further 
maintain domination over the oppressed by passively or actively encouraging those 
oppressed to accept/welcome their position of powerlessness. As Honneth writes: 
 
The pride that ‘Uncle Tom’ feels as a reaction to the repeated praise of the 
submissive virtues makes him into a compliant servant in a slave-owning society. 
The emotional appeals to the ‘good’ mother and housewife made by churches, 
parliaments, or the mass media over the centuries caused women to remain trapped 
within a self-image that most effectively accommodated the gender-specific division 
                                                 
53 Honneth, 2014: 329.   
54 For further on this, see Honneth, 2003: 114-134. 
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of labour. The public esteem enjoyed by heroic soldiers continuously engendered a 
sufficiently large class of men who willingly went to war in pursuit of glory and 
adventure … [These examples] … make strikingly clear that social recognition can 
always also operate as a conformist ideology, for the continuous repetition of 
identical forms of recognition can create a feeling of self-worth that provides the 
motivational resources for forms of voluntary subordination without employing 
methods of repression.55 
 
In addition to failing to adequately distribute material resources amongst members of 
society, ideology functions to prevent cognitive resources from being adequately 
allocated to the oppressed. For, if the powerless have access to epistemic resources 
necessary for overcoming their hermeneutic marginalisation, not only can they begin to 
make sense of their experiences and their dominated position, they can also crucially 
develop Consciousness-Raising initiatives, which in turn can help bring about solidarity 
movements, to form practical ways of bringing about radical social change. 
      From this perspective, then, the principal harmfulness of hermeneutical injustice 
consists in depriving a victim of having access to the self-interpretational dimension of 
rational agency: this represents a specific variety of alienation, because an indispensable 
feature of rational agency is one’s ability to make sense of one’s experiences. Due to 
individuals and/or groups being alienated from a crucial part of their rationality, 
asymmetrical cognitive resource distribution further entrenches the normative power of 
ideology. This seems to complement and expand on what Fricker writes here: “The 
primary harm of hermeneutical injustice, then, is to be understood not only in terms of 
the subject’s being unfairly disadvantaged by some collective hermeneutical lacuna, but 
also in terms of the very construction (constitutive and/or causal) of selfhood”.56   
      The curative programme for overcoming the social pathology of hermeneutical 
injustice that Fricker recommends adopting is one which aims to create “a more inclusive 
hermeneutical climate—one without structural identity prejudice”.57 For the recognition 
theorist, a more inclusive hermeneutical climate can only be meaningfully brought about 
by proposing significant progressive changes to the recognition order governing society:  
 
Hermeneutical Injustice Hermeneutical Justice 
Material and  cognitive resources are maldistributed Material and  cognitive resources are symmetrically 
distributed 
                                                 
55 Honneth, 2007b: 325-6.    
56 Fricker, 2007: 168. 
57 Ibid., p. 170. 
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Asymmetrical resource distribution further 
entrenches the normative power of ideology 
Symmetrical resource distribution limits the normative 
power of ideology 
Structural identity prejudice  Structural identity prejudice Consciousness-Raising 
initiatives   
 
 
From an intersectionist perspective, mutual recognition and hermeneutical justice could 
only be fully generalised and receive institutionalised support in a society that was not or 
no longer capitalist, racist, sexist, etc. But that does not mean (and cannot mean) that 
mutual recognition and hermeneutical justice are impossible under the regressive 
neoliberal market sphere. It means rather that mutual recognition and hermeneutical 
justice will be difficult to achieve under existing conditions.58 Recognition theory shares 
much in common with a social democratic call for progressive correction, where the goal 
of social critique is a world in which recognition is no longer subversive: progressive reform 
of how resources are distributed to make sense of one’s experiences aims to shift unequal power 
relations that are directly responsible for the hermeneutical lacuna and the kind of alienation that is 
produced by hermeneutical marginalisation and that further entrenches ideology. This critical 
theoretic remark complements Fricker’s position on the virtue of hermeneutical justice: 
attentiveness to how shifting unequal power relations enables access to the self-
interpretational dimension of rational agency can help “neutralise the impact of 
structural identity prejudice on one’s credibility judgement”.59        
 
      I take the arguments proposed in this paper to hopefully go to some considerable 
length in bringing recognition theory and the literature on epistemic injustice into 
conversation: there is scope for a new set of conversations and contributions about 
epistemic injustice, exclusion, and silencing, one which assesses the prospects of 
approaching epistemic injustice from the perspective of recognition theory and vice 
versa, and that this conjunction could help feminist and critical race theory address 
current social challenges. The failure of mutual recognition explains how epistemic injustice is 
possible: Not adequately epistemically recognising is a damning indictment of society on 
the grounds that its social structure and moral grammar fail to encourage the quest for 
                                                 
58 As Carl Sachs helpfully raised in conversation. 
59 Ibid., p. 168. 
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self-realisation and thereby leaves individuals who are prejudiced against in a state of 
self-alienation. While, of course, we may never approximate epistemic justice and 
intersubjective recognition, the ideas of epistemic justice and intersubjective recognition, 
as Kant would say, are “to be diligently pursued as the vocation of the human race” 
(APPV: 331).      
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